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INTRODUCTION 
In constitutional law, the gold standard of individual liberties is the specific 
pronouncements found in the Bill of Rights, 1 the first ten amendments adopted to 
protect against abuses of power by government officials.2 While all of us benefit 
from the balance of power that these protections ensure, many of the amendments' 
limits on governmental overreaching are particularly important to those of us the 
government suspects of committing a crime. The Fifth Amendment, for example, 
provides for indictment by a grand jury, and prohibits the government from holding 
* Law Clerk to Judge Deborah L. Cook, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit; J.D., Vanderbilt University Law School; M.A. (Psychology), University of 
Pennsylvania; B.A., Swarthmore College. For helpful comments, inspiration, and general 
good will, the author thanks Patricia Farren, Nancy King, Thomas McCoy, and Priya 
Travassos. 
1 For example, courts are especially careful to protect enumerated rights from unjustified 
government infringement. See, e.g., W.Va. State Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 
( 1943) ("Much of the vagueness of the due process clause disappears when the specific pro-
hibitions of the First [Amendment] become its standard .... [F]reedoms of speech and of 
press, of assembly, and of worship ... are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and 
immediate danger to interests which the state may lawfully protect."); see also United States 
v. CaroleneProds. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (proposing a "narrower scope for oper-
ation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within 
a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments"). Also, 
courts generally presume that the rights listed in the first eight amendments apply to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Michael Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 
VA. L. REV. 951, 971 (2002) ("Enumeration in the Bill of Rights creates a rebuttable 
presumption that a right applies against the states, and lack of enumeration creates a 
rebuttable presumption against recognizing a proposed right against state or federal action."). 
2 See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (noting that the "predominant 
political impulse" of proponents of the Bill of Rights "was distrust of power, and they 
insisted on constitutional limitations against its abuse"); Barron v. Mayor of Bait., 32 U.S. 
(7 Pet.) 243, 249 ( 1833) ("In almost every convention by which the constitution was adopted, 
amendments to guard against the abuse of power were recommended."); see also Louis 
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REv. 961, 1220 n.633 
(2001) (''The procedural protections in the Bill of Rights are grounded in significant part in 
concerns about abuse of power."). 
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a person in jeopardy twice for the same offense, from compelling a defendant to 
testify against himself, and from depriving anyone of life, liberty, or property 
without due process. 3 The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant a 
lengthy list of trial rights, from the right to a speedy trial to the right to assistance 
of counsel.4 And the Eighth Amendment prohibits excessive bail, along with cruel 
and unusual punishments.5 
In addition to these specific rights, the Supreme Court has read the Sixth 
Amendment to include a right to be present to defend against the government's 
charges.6 This right means not only that the defendant must be given the opportu-
nity to be physically present, but also that he must possess the mental ability both 
to understand the charges against him and to consult with his lawyer in preparing 
a defense.7 A defendant who lacks this mental ability is incompetent to stand trial.8 
Some defendants are incompetent to stand trial because of disorders that are 
essentially untreatable, such as mental retardation; these defendants are unlikely ever 
to become competent. Other defendants, who are incompetent because of a treatable 
mental illness such as schizophrenia, might become competent if they receive 
3 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
4 The Sixth Amendment provides that: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have 
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature 
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense. 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
5 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
6 See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1934). 
7 The Due Process Clause prohibits the conviction of a defendant who is incompetent 
to stand trial. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966) (''The State concedes that the 
conviction of an accused person while he is legally incompetent violates due process, and 
that state procedures must be adequate to protect this right." (citing Bishop v. United States, 
350 U.S. 961 (1956))). The test for competence to stand trial is whether a defendant "has 
sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding - and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him." Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). 
8 The law recognizes various kinds of competence, from competence to consent to medical 
treatment, to competence to make a will. As used in this Article, the term "competence" only 
refers to competence to stand trial, unless otherwise indicated. See supra note 7 (discussing 
test for competence to stand trial). An additional note on terminology: this Article refers to 
the government's interest in rendering a defendant competentto stand trial. Some cases refer 
to the interest as one of "restoring" competence, suggesting, perhaps erroneously, that the 
defendant has been competent at some time in the past. See, e.g., United States v. Weston, 
255 F.3d 873, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (referring to "the governmental interest in restoring a 
pretrial detainee's competence to stand trial"), cen. denied, 534 U.S. 1067 (2001). 
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treatment- usually antipsychotic or other psychotropic medications that can poten-
tially alleviate, although not cure, the symptoms of schizophrenia and other 
psychotic disorders.9 But a defendant who, because of his mental illness, believes 
that his doctors, or the FBI, or the special beings that communicate with him 
through his radio, are trying to poison him, or are taking thoughts out of his head, 
or are otherwise out to get him, can be difficult to convince that taking psychotropic 
medications is in his best medical interest. 10 If a defendant refuses to take these 
medications, the government is left to decide whether to seek a court order allowing 
for the administration of the medications over the defendant's objections. 11 
Several difficult issues arise, however, when the government requests such an 
order. The first issue, common to all cases in which the government seeks to admin-
ister involuntary medications, is that administering the medications must serve a 
government interest - such as preventing a mentally ill person from harming 
himself or others - that justifies abridging the person's interest in refusing un-
wanted medical treatments. 12 An additional issue, unique to cases in which the 
government seeks to administer involuntary medications to a criminal defendant for 
the purpose of rendering him competent to stand trial, is that the medications will 
threaten many of the defendant's trial rights. Any medication that succeeds in 
rendering the defendant competent to stand trial is likely to alter his mental 
functioning and physical appearance in myriad ways, thereby potentially compro-
mising the fairness of his trial. 13 For example, a medicated defendant can have 
9 See infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. 
10 As one leading abnormal psychology text explains: 
A major problem with any kind of treatment for schizophrenia is 
that many patients with schizophrenia lack insight into their impaired 
condition and refuse any treatment at all. As they don't believe they 
have an illness, they don't see the need for professional intervention, 
particularly when it includes hospitalization or drugs. This is especially 
true of those with paranoid schizophrenia, who may regard any therapy 
as a threatening intrusion from hostile outside forces. 
GERALD C. DAVISON & JOHN M. NEALE, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 304 (8th ed. 2003) 
(citation omitted). 
11 See infra note 92 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. 
13 See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 138 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
("[l]nvoluntary medication with antipsychotic drugs poses a serious threat to a defendant's 
right to a fair trial."); United States v. Gomes, 289 F.3d 71, 80 (2d Cir. 2002) ("[A]nti-
psychotic drugs can affect a defendant's in-court demeanor as well as his willingness and 
ability to assist in his defense, thereby implicating Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial."), 
vacated by 539 U.S. 939 (2003); United States v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(per curiam) ("Involuntary antipsychotic medication has the potential to adversely affect the 
defendant's ability to obtain a fair trial as guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment."). 
If successful in rendering a previously incompetent defendant competent to stand trial, 
medications have necessarily altered the defendant's mental functioning in some ways. It is 
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difficulty concentrating, 14 and thus he might have problems consulting with his 
attorney or testifying on his own behalf. Medications can also unfairly prejudice a 
jury's perception of a defendant's character or credibility. A jury might decide that 
a defendant who looks drowsy or disinterested15 is coldhearted or that a defendant 
who is experiencing motor tremors 16 is nervous or not telling the truth. 
implausible to believe that such medications would alter only those particular mental 
processes that enable a defendant to understand the nature of the charges against him and to 
assist his attorney in preparing a defense, see supra note 7 (discussing criteria for competence 
to stand trial), leaving every other aspect of the defendant's mental functioning unaltered. 
Some courts have suggested that these additional changes will increase, at least in some 
ways, the fairness of a defendant's trial. See, e.g., Weston, 255 F.3d at 883 (asserting that 
medications will "enhance some of Weston's trial rights"). Even if this is true, though, a 
government action that enhances a trial's fairness in one way does not thereby make up for 
diminishing the trial's fairness in other ways. The government must allow the defendant the 
opportunity to exercise all the rights guaranteed under the Constitution. 
14 See ROBERT M. JUUEN, A PRIMER OF DRUG ACTION 508 (9th ed. 2001) (stating that 
antipsychotic medications such as Haldol, as well as all of the phenothiazines, "produce[] 
sedation and an indifference to external stimuli and reduce[] initiative, anxiety, and 
activity"). These traditional antipsychotic medications also can exacerbate the cognitive 
impairments associated with some psychotic disorders. See id. at 507 (citing research 
indicating that antipsychotic medications generally do not improve the cognitive functioning 
of people with schizophrenia, and that "[p]henothiazines with anticholinergic and/or sedative 
side effects may even have additional detriments"). Even the newer antipsychotics cause 
sedation. See id. at 514 ("Sedation occurs in about 40 percent of patients taking clozapine; 
it may be dose-limiting and have a negative impact on compliance.~') (emphasis omitted); id. 
at 517 (noting that "[c]ommon side effects of risperidone include somnolence"); id. at 520 
(stating that "[t]he major side effects induced by olanzapine" include "sedation"). The 
atypicals also cause other side effects that can interfere with the ability to concentrate. See 
id. at 514 (stating that clozapine can cause "hypotension" and "excessive drooling"); id. at 
517 (explaining that agitation and anxiety are common side effects ofrisperidone); id. at 520 
(noting that olanzapine's major side effects include dizziness). 
15 See supra note 14 (indicating that antipsychotic medications can cause side effects that 
include sedation). 
Courts might try to minimize the risk that medication effects will deprive a defendant 
of a fair trial by informing the jury about the medication or allowing experts to testify about 
the medication. See, e.g., Weston, 206 F.3d at 15 (Henderson, J., concurring) ("[T]he 
testimony of both lay and expert witnesses, whether on direct or cross, will suffice to address 
any differences in Weston's appearance."). If a jury convicts a defendant to whom the 
government is administering involuntary medications, however, there is no way to determine 
whether the jury found the defendant guilty because of the evidence against him or because 
the government, by administering the medications, prevented the defendant from being able 
to focus on his attorney's advice, to express his thoughts to the jury, or even to sit still or stay 
awake during the trial. Cf Riggins, 504 U.S. at 137 ("Efforts to prove or disprove actual 
prejudice from the record before us would be futile, and guesses whether the outcome of the 
trial might have been different if Riggins' motion [to discontinue antipsychotic medications] 
had been granted would be purely speculative."). 
16 Motor disturbances are the most significant side effects produced by the traditional 
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Given the importance of the right to a fair trial, and the threat to this right puseu 
by administering involuntary medications, the Supreme Court understandably 
cautions in its recent decision in the case of Sell v. United States11 that the instances 
in which the government will be justified in administering such medications for the 
purpose of rendering a defendant competent to stand trial "may be rare."18 Under 
the test the Court sets forth in Sell, however, what instead might be rare are 
instances in which a court decides that involuntary medications are not justified. 
In discussing why the Sell test likely will result in the administration of 
involuntary medications to incompetent defendants in more than rare instances, this 
Article considers both what the Court's opinion in Sell says and what it fails to say. 
One thing the Sell opinion does address is the factors that courts must consider when 
deciding whether the government may administer involuntary medications to render 
a defendant competent to stand trial. 19 Under the Sell test, the government may 
administer involuntary medication that is (1) "medically appropriate," (2) "substan-
tially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial," (3) 
decided upon after "taking accountofless intrusive alternatives," and (4) "necessary 
significantly to further important governmental trial-related interests."20 
As discussed in Part I, this test favors allowing the government to administer 
involuntary medications, at the expense of protecting the defendant's trial rights, 
because in many, if not almost all, cases it is likely that the government will easily 
meet the first three criteria of the Sell test. The first criterion requires only that 
antipsychotic medications: 
Neuroleptic drugs produce two main kinds of motor disturbances, 
which comprise both the most bothersome and the most serious side 
effects associated with the use of these agents. The two syndromes are 
( 1) acute extrapyramidal reactions, which develop early in treatment in 
up to 90 percent of patients, and (2) tardive (late) dyskinesia, which 
occurs much later, during and even after cessation of chronic neuro-
leptic therapy. 
JULIEN, supra note 14, at 504. Although newer drugs are less likely to produce motor 
disturbances, this advantage of atypical anti psychotics appears to exist only at lower doses, 
and perhaps only for patients who have previously taken traditional antipsychotics: 
Extrapyramidal symptoms are minimal at doses below 8 mg/day and 
increase with doses above 8 mglday. However, in newly diagnosed 
patients with schizophrenia with no previous exposure to antipsychot-
ic drugs, extrapyramidal symptoms were identical to those produced 
by haloperidol, even at low doses of risperidol (mean daily dose was 
3.2mg). 
/d. at517-18. 
17 539 u.s. 166 (2003). 
18 Id. at 180. 
19 /d. at 179. 
20 /d. 
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treatment be medically appropriate, an in general, antipsychotic medications are 
medically appropriate for the treatment of serious psychotic disorders.21 Also, 
because these medications are usually the only type of treatment capable of 
alleviating the symptoms of such disorders and possibly rendering a defendant 
competent to stand trial,22 courts are likely to find that no less intrusive alternatives 
exist, satisfying the third criterion. Moreover, although all antipsychotic medicat-
ions are likely to cause some side effects, no way presently exists for predicting the 
particular side effects a defendant will experience if administered a particular 
medication.23 As a result, most courts will lack a sufficient basis for finding that, if 
administered involuntary medications, a defendant will likely experience side effects 
that will undermine the fairness of his trial.24 Involuntary medications, therefore, 
are likely, in at least some cases, to cause side effects that will undermine a trial's 
fairness, but courts are unlikely in any given case to decide that the defendant will 
experience such side effects - and also unlikely to rule against involuntary 
medications because of the second criterion. The only real limiting factor in the Sell 
test is the last criterion, which requires courts to decide whether the government's 
interests are "important" - a concept that the Court in Sell leaves undefined and 
that since Sell, lower courts have defined in a variety of ways. 
The Court's opinion in Sell also instructs trial courts that, whenever possible, 
they should decide whether to allow the government to administer involuntary 
medications on the basis of the government's interest in preventing an incompetent 
defendant from harming himself or others rather than on the basis of its interest in 
rendering the defendant competent to stand trial. 25 The criteria for determining 
whether to allow the government to administer involuntary medications to diminish 
the defendant's dangerousness, however, provide for no consideration of trial 
rights. 26 Yet a defendant who not only is incompetent to stand trial, but also is a 
danger to himself or others, has the same interest in receiving a fair trial as does an 
incompetent defendant who is not a danger to himself or others. Given that no 
sufficiently important government interest justifies this disparate treatment with 
respect to incompetent defendants' trial rights,27 the Court's instruction raises the 
possibility that mentally ill defendants who are both incompetent and dangerous will 
21 See DAVISON & NEALE, supra note 10, at 308 ("Antipsychotic drugs are an 
indispensable part of treatment for schizophrenia and will undoubtedly continue to be an 
important component."). 
22 See infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra Part I.C.l. 
27 See infra Part I.C.2. 
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suffer violations of not only their right to a fair trial but also their right to the equat 
protection of the laws. 
Part II discusses what the Court's opinion in Sell does not say. First, the Court's 
opinion does not acknowledge that the lower courts in Sell were far from alone in 
their efforts to determine when the government may administer involuntary 
medications to render a defendant competent to stand trial. 28 Many other courts, 
most notably the D.C. District Court and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in the 
case of United States v. Weston, 29 have considered the same question and have 
reached the same conclusion - to allow involuntary medications - as did the 
lower courts in Sell. 30 Also, disappointingly absent from the Court's Sell decision 
is an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, whose opinions in previous involuntary 
medication cases have been especially discerning.31 
I. CURIOUS: WHAT THE SELL OPINION DOES SAY 
A. Supreme Court Precedents and the Facts of Sell 
Charles Thomas Sell, a St. Louis dentist, faces multiple counts of falsifying 
insurance clairns.32 The charges were filed in 1997, nearly six years before the 
Supreme Court heard Sell's case.33 The government has been delayed in bringing 
this case to trial because Sell, diagnosed with a delusional disorder that has rendered 
him unable to understand the nature of the charges brought against him and unable 
to assist his attorney in preparing a defense, has been ruled incompetent to stand 
trial. 34 The government believes that treating Sell with antipsychotic medications 
might sufficiently alleviate the symptoms of his mental illness so that he would 
become competent to stand trial. 35 Sell believes that the insurance fraud charges 
are part of a larger conspiracy against him and has refused to take any of the 
28 See infra note 117 and accompanying text. 
29 See United States v. Weston, 69 F. Supp. 2d 99 (D.D.C. 1999), rev'd, 206 F.3d 9 (D.C. 
Cir. 2000): United States v. Weston, 134F. Supp. 2d 115 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 255 F.3d 873 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1067 (2001). 
30 See infra notes 117-23 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra notes 130-34 and accompanying text. 
32 Sell, 539 U.S. at 170. Sell has been charged with additional offenses that were not the 
subject of the appeal. See United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560, 568 n.8 (8th Cir. 2002) 
("Although Sell is also charged with conspiring to murder an FBI officer and a witness, we 
base our reasoning solely on the seriousness of the fraud charges.") vacated, 539 U.S. 166 
(2003). 
33 Sell, 539 U.S. at 170 (indicating that charges were filed in May 1997). 
34 See id. 
35 See id. 
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medications the government wants him to take.36 The question presented to the 
Court was whether the government could administer these medications to Sell 
despite his desire not to take them. 37 
When the government ftrst sought to administer involuntary medications to Sell, 
it argued that the medications were necessary not only to render Sell competent to 
stand trial but also to prevent him from harming himself or others. 38 It is well-
established that an individual's interest in refusing medications39 can be outweighed 
by the government's interest in protecting the health and safety of the public and 
also, although in more limited circumstances,40 by the government's interest in 
protecting the health and safety of the individual himself.41 Thus, the government 
could probably administer involuntary treatment to Sell if he were so seriously 
mentally ill that he posed a danger to himself or others.42 
36 !d. at 171 (quoting a medical report noting "'the persistence of Dr. Sell's belief that the 
Courts, FBI and federal government in general are against him'"); see also Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 11-12, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (No. 02-5664): 
!d. 
Question: As I take it, ... he thinks that's why he is being prosecuted, 
is that it, that the FBI is behind this? 
Mr. Short [Sell's attorney]: Justice Souter, that's absolutely true. 
37 Sell, 539 U.S. at 171; see also Sell v. United States, 537 U.S. 999, 999-1000 (2002) 
(granting certiorari). 
38 Sell, 539 U.S. at 172-73. 
39 See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990)("We have no doubtthat. .. 
respondent possesses a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration 
of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."). 
40 See infra note 42. 
41 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). The Court wrote: 
!d. at 426. 
The state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers 
in providing care to its citizens who are unable because of emotional 
disorders to care for themselves; the state also has authority under its 
police power to protect the community from the dangerous tendencies 
of some who are mentally ill. 
42 If Sell were a danger to his own safety, but not to others' safety, then the government 
might be allowed to administer involuntary medications only if Sell were also incompetent 
to make his own treatment decisions. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep'tofHealth, 497 U.S. 261, 
278 ( 1990) (''The principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty 
interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions."). 
But see Harper, 494 U.S. at 222. The Court allowed the government to administer 
involuntary medications to a prison inmate even when he was competent to make his own 
treatment decisions: 
Respondent contends that the State, under the mandate of the Due 
Process Clause, may not override his choice to refuse antipsychotic 
drugs unless he has been found to be incompetent .... We disagree. 
The extent of a prisoner's right under the Clause to avoid the unwanted 
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A magistrate judge agreed with the government that medications were necessary 
to prevent Sell from injuring himself or others.43 The district court disagreed with 
the magistrate judge's finding,44 however, and by the time the case reached the 
Supreme Court, the only government interest that might have justified administering 
involuntary medications to Sell was the possibility that the medications would 
render him competent to stand trial.45 
Prior to Sell, the Court had never directly addressed the question of what 
governmental interests can justify overriding an incompetent criminal defendant's 
interest in refusing medication; the closest the Court had come was to state, in the 
1992 case of Riggins v. Nevada, that one prerequisite to administering involuntary 
medications is that a court must find that the governmental interests at stake justify 
the medications.46 The Nevada trial court in Riggins had not required the govern-
ment to offer any reason for its decision to administer involuntary medications to 
Riggins before and during his trial for first-degree murder.47 A jury convicted 
Riggins and sentenced him to death; the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed.48 The 
U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Nevada Supreme Court's affirmance, establishing 
that before allowing involuntary medications, a trial court must make some finding 
regarding the government's interests.49 As Justice Kennedy observed in a 
concurring opinion, however, the Court's decision was vague about what such a 
finding must include.50 Not surprisingly, after Riggins, lower courts reached an 
administration of antipsychotic drugs must be defined in the context of 
the inmate's confinement. 
/d. Additionally, even if the government could administer medications to diminish Sell's 
dangerousness, the question would - or at least should - still remain whether the gov-
ernment could both administer involuntary medications for the purpose of diminishing 
dangerousness and also continue to prosecute Sell without violating Sell's right to a fair trial. 
See infra Part I.C. 
43 Sell, 539 U.S. at 173 (stating that the magistrate judge concluded that the government 
had proven that "anti-psychotic medications are the only way to render the defendant not 
dangerous and competent to stand trial"). 
44 /d.at174. 
45 /d. at 175. 
46 Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 138 (1992) ("[T]he record contains no finding that 
might support a conclusion that administration of antipsychotic medication was necessary 
to accomplish an essential state policy .... "). 
47 /d. at 131 ("The District Court denied Riggins's motion to terminate medication with 
a one-page order that gave no indication of the court's rationale."). 
48 See id. at 132 (discussing procedural history). 
49 /d. at 138. 
50 See id. at 140 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (''The Court's opinion will require further 
proceedings on remand, but there seems to be little discussion about what is to be 
considered."). 
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array of contradictory conclusions about when the government may administer 
involuntary medications to incompetent defendants.51 
The Court's decision in Sell clarifies a few of the broad questions that Riggins 
left unanswered. For example, after Riggins it was unclear whether rendering a 
defendant competent to stand trial could ever justify administering involuntary 
medications when the medications were not also justified by the defendant's 
dangerousness to himself or others. 52 Sell makes clear that the answer is yes. 53 But 
the Supreme Court could not determine whether the government's interest in 
bringing Sell to trial justified administering involuntary medications to him because, 
as in Riggins, the Court concluded that the trial court had erred in allowing for the 
administration of involuntary medications without first making all of the necessary 
findings.54 
B. The Not-So-Limited "Limited" Sell Standard 
The Supreme Court suggested that the standard it adopted in Sell will result in 
the administration of involuntary medications to incompetent criminal defendants 
"in limited circumstances."55 The particular questions that the Court indicated that 
trial courts must ask, however, are essentially the same questions that these courts, 
including the lower courts in Sell, have been asking, with most deciding to allow 
31 Compare United States v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947, 960 (6th Cir. 1998) (concluding that 
"the decision to medicate a non-dangerous pretrial detainee must survive strict scrutiny"), 
with United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (requiring "heightened 
scrutiny" rather than strict scrutiny). Recent decisions have overwhelmingly followed Weston 
rather than Brandon. See, e.g., United States v. Gomes, 289 F.3d 71, 82 (2d Cir. 2002). The 
court wrote: 
In accord with Riggins, Sell, and Weston, we hold that heightened, but 
not strict, scrutiny is the appropriate standard .... Although we are not 
unmindful of Brandon's concerns about the important interests of the 
defendant, we cannot accept the proposition that involuntary medi-
cation should be limited to defendants who are prosecuted for only the 
most heinous crimes. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
52 See United States v. Weston, 69 F. Supp. 2d 99, Ill (D.D.C. 1999) ("[T]he case law 
does not clearly indicate whether the government can forcibly medicate a defendant solely 
to render him competent to stand trial."), rev' d, 206 F.3d 9 (D.C. Cir. 2000); cf Riggins, 504 
U.S. at 135 (''The question whether a competent criminal defendant may refuse antipsychotic 
medication if cessation of medication would render him incompetent at trial is not before 
us."). Notably, the trial court had not found Riggins incompetent to stand trial but 
nonetheless refused Riggins's request to discontinue psychotropic medications during his 
trial. Id. at 130-31. 
53 Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003). 
54 Id. at 185. 
55 Id. at 169. 
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involuntary medications.56 After Sell, courts' discussions can be expected to be 
more thorough; nothing in the Supreme Court's opinion, however, provides a basis 
for believing that these courts' conclusions will be any different. 
According to Sell, the first question a trial court must consider before allowing 
the government to administer involuntary medications to an incompetent defendant 
for the purpose of rendering the defendant competent to stand trial is whether the 
medications are "medically appropriate."57 The Court in Sell imported this require-
ment from the 1990 decision in Washington v. Harper, a case in which a prison 
inmate argued that he was constitutionally entitled to a judicial hearing to determine 
whether the government could compel him to take psychotropic medications. 58 In 
the prison setting, antipsychotic medications are sometimes used as a "chemical 
straightjacket"59 to sedate unruly inmates; this practice led the Harper Court to adopt 
the requirement that medications must be medically appropriate in order to ensure 
that antipsychotics were administered only to treat psychotic symptoms and not to 
manage behavior problems.60 
But while administering antipsychotic medications to an unruly, mentally 
retarded prison inmate, for example, might effectively diminish his unruliness, 
administering antipsychotic medications to an incompetent, mentally retarded 
56 The standard applied by the Eighth Circuit in Sell: 
First, the government must present an essential state interest that 
outweighs the individual's interest in remaining free from medication. 
Second, the government must prove that there is no less intrusive way 
of fulfilling its essential interest. Third, the government must prove by 
clear and convincing evidence that the medication is medically appro-
priate. Medication is medically appropriate if: (1) it is likely to render 
the patient competent; (2) the likelihood and gravity of side effects do 
not overwhelm its benefits; and (3) it is in the best medical interests of 
the patient. 
United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560, 567 (8th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted), vacated, 539 U.S. 
166 (2003). 
57 /d. A medication is medically appropriate if it is "in the best medical interests of the 
patient" in light of his medical condition. !d. 
58 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 217 (1990). 
59 See generally Douglas Mossman, Unbuckling the "Chemical Straightjacket": The 
Legal Significance of Recent Advances in the Pharmacological Treatment of Psychosis, 39 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1033 (2002). 
60 Harper, 494 U.S. at 244-45 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
("Use of psychotropic drugs, the State readily admits, serves to ease the institutional and 
administrative burdens of maintaining prison security and provides a means of managing an 
unruly prison population and preventing property damage."); id. at 226 (indicating that the 
Court upheld the constitutionality of a state statute governing the administration of 
involuntary medications to prison inmates in part because under the statute "[t]he drugs may 
be administered for no purpose other than treatment"). 
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defendant will not be effective in rendering him competentY When a defendant is 
incompetent to stand trial, administering medically inappropriate medications will 
not achieve anything the government wants - a sedated incompetent defendant can 
no more be brought to trial than a non-sedated incompetent defendant. Thus, the 
government seems unlikely to seek to administer medically inappropriate medi-
cations to an incompetent pretrial defendant. 
Although it continues to be cited by almost every court that considers the 
question of administering involuntary medications to incompetent defendants,62 
Harper is factually not at all similar to these cases. Harper's "medically appro-
priate" requirement therefore is not very likely to limit the number of cases in which 
a court approves the government's request to administer involuntary medications 
for the purpose of rendering a defendant competent to stand trial. 
The part of the Sell test most likely to cause courts to deny the government's 
petition to administer involuntary medications is the requirement that "important 
governmental interests [must be] at stake."63 The Court stated that bringing to trial 
a defendant accused of "serious" crimes is an important government interest.64 The 
Court did not, however, offer any details about how courts should distinguish 
between serious and nonserious crimes. The Eighth Circuit panel that reviewed the 
district court's decision to allow involuntary medications in Sell was divided over 
this issue, with two judges deciding that the insurance fraud charges were 
sufficiently serious and one judge arguing that they were not.65 
61 Medical appropriateness is still a useful criteria to have, however, to protect against 
potential abuse, such as the tactics suggested by Justice Kennedy during oral argument in 
Sell: "Could you send your guy out there with a needle the day before the trial ... so that he 
behaves the way the government wants him to at trial?" Online NewsHour Update: Supreme 
Court Hears Court-Ordered Medication Case, Public Broadcasting Service (Mar. 3, 2003) 
(quoting Justice Kennedy's question to a government lawyer), at http://www.pbs.org/ 
newshour/updates/scotus_03-03-03.html [hereinafter PBS NewsHour Update]. Additionally, 
a particular antipsychotic might be medically inappropriate for a particular defendant. For 
example, an atypical antipsychotic that tends to cause weight gain might be medically 
inappropriate for a defendant who suffers from diabetes. See Brief of Amicus Curiae 
American Psychiatric Association and American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 
Supporting Respondent at 18, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (No. 02-5664) 
[hereinafter APA Brief] (noting "a risk of weight gain and, from long-term use, a risk of 
diabetes" associated with newer antipsychotics). It seems unlikely, though, that 
antipsychotics as a whole would be medically inappropriate, so long as they were being 
administered to treat a psychotic disorder. 
62 See, e.g., Sell, 282 F.3d at 567; United States v. Gomes, 289 F.3d 71, 86 (2d Cir. 
2002). 
63 Sell, 539 U.S. at 180. 
64 !d. ("The Government's interest in bringing to trial an individual accused of a serious 
crime is important."). 
65 Compare Sell, 282 F.3d at 568 ("[T]he sixty-two charges of fraud and the single charge 
of money-laundering are serious."), with id. at 572 (Bye, J., dissenting) ("[T]he charges 
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The Supreme Court did reject the position that only violent crimes can be 
serious,66 stating that "[t]he Government's interest in bringing to trial an individual 
accused of a serious crime is important ... whether the offense is a serious crime 
against the person or a serious crime against property."67 But the Court did not 
decide whether the insurance fraud alleged in Sell is sufficiently serious to justify 
involuntary medications. The Court also did not discuss any objective criteria, such 
as potential minimum or maximum sentence,68 that future courts- including the 
Sell district court on remand - might look to in deciding whether a particular 
alleged offense is "serious."69 Certainly, every crime is in some measure a violation 
of, in the words of the Court in Sell, "the basic human need for security."7° Further, 
the Court quoted with approval from Illinois,.v. Allen that the "[p]ower to bring an 
accused to trial is fundamental to a scheme of'ordered liberty' and a prerequisite to 
social justice and peace."71 This statement suggests that the power to bring any 
defendant to trial is a fundamental governmental interest.72 
Left largely on their own, federal courts since Sell have used a myriad of 
conflicting criteria to determine whether a particular offense is "serious." In United 
against Dr. Sell are not sufficiently serious to forcibly inject him with antipsychotic drugs 
on the chance it will make him competent to stand trial."). 
66 Sell, 539 U.S. at 180; cf Sell v. United States, 537 U.S. 999, 999-1000 (2002) 
(granting certiorari on question whether "the Court of Appeals erred in rejecting petitioner's 
argument that allowing the Government to administer antipsychotic medications against his 
will solely to render him competent to stand trial for non-violent offenses would violate his 
rights under the First, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments") (emphasis added). 
67 Sell, 539 U.S. at 180. 
68 Cf Sell, 282 F.3d at 573 (Bye, J., dissenting). Judge Bye wrote: 
An overly generous estimation of Dr. Sell's alleged illegal activity 
would place the value of his fraud within the range of $400,000 to 
$1,000,000. Applying this estimate, his base offense level would be 
20 and (assuming he has no prior criminal history) his sentencing 
range would be 33-41 months. This sentencing range demonstrates 
the charges against him are not serious enough to justify forcible 
medication. 
/d. (citation omitted); United States v. Gomes, 289 F.3d 71, 86 (2d Cir. 2002) (indicating that 
alleged possession of a gun by a felon is serious enough to justify involuntary medications, 
because it is a felony offense and, under the facts of the case, would carry a statutory 
minimum sentence of fifteen years). 
69 Sell, 539 U.S. at 180 (discussing "serious" crimes). For a broader discussion of the 
difficulties involved in judging the seriousness of various crimes, see generally Eugene 
Volokh, Crime Severity and Constitutional Line-Drawing, 90 VA. L. REv. 1957 (2004). 
70 Sell, 539 U.S. at 180. 
71 ld. (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)). 
72 It is unlikely, perhaps, that the government would choose to expend the necessary 
resources to obtain an order allowing involuntary medication when an incompetent defendant 
has been charged with jaywalking, for example. But such pragmatic, contingent constraints 
are a poor substitute for the enforcement of constitutional guarantees. 
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States v. Evans, for example, the Western District of Virginia held that a serious 
crime is one that carries a maximum sentence of more than six months impris-
onment.73 The Western District of Texas rejected this six-month standard in United 
States v. Barajas-Torres, ruling that under Sell only crimes against persons or 
property can be serious, and denying the government's request to administer invol-
untary medications to an incompetent defendant charged with illegal reentry into the 
United States.74 Also in conflict are United States v. Gomes, in which the District 
of Connecticut allowed involuntary medications because, in light of the potential 
mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years, possession of a firearm by a 
convicted felon is a serious offense/5 and United States v. Dumeny, in which the 
District of Maine denied involuntary medications because even though it "carries 
significant potential penalties," possession of a firearm by a person previously 
committed to a mental health institute is not a serious offense. 76 
Once a trial court decides that the government's interest is "important", 77 it must 
then ask whether "involuntary medication will significantly forther" that interest.78 
This question - which concerns the likelihood that medications will render the 
defendant competent to stand trial, balanced against the likelihood that the 
medications will cause side effects that will compromise the fairness of the 
defendant's trial79 - is unlikely to limit the instances in which trial courts allow 
involuntary medications. Given the current state of knowledge about the treatment 
of mental illnesses, courts presently have no choice but to base their decisions on 
generalized, rather than individualized, information about the likelihood that 
involuntary medications will render defendants competent to stand trial or infringe 
their right to a fair trial. For example, antipsychotic medications are effective in 
alleviating at least some symptoms of the most common psychotic disorder, 
schizophrenia, in eighty to ninety percent of cases. 80 Additionally, a few variables, 
such as late onset of the disorder and good premorbid functioning, are associated 
with a better response to medications, but even these factors are far from perfect 
predictors of how a defendant will respond to antipsychotic rnedications.81 For 
73 293 F. Supp. 2d 668, 674 (W.D. Va. 2003). 
74 2004 WL 1598914, at *2-4 (W.D. Tex. July 1, 2004). 
15 305 F. Supp. 2d 158, 164, aff'd, 387 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2004). 
76 295 F. Supp. 2d 131, 132 (2004). 
77 Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003). 
78 !d. at 181. 
79 !d. 
80 See JULIEN, supra note 14, at 588 ("A substantial proportion of schizophrenic 
patients- about 10 to 20 percent- fail to demonstrate substantial improvement when they 
are treated with neuro1eptics." (quoting S.R. Marder et al., Schizophrenia, 16 PSYCHIATRIC 
CLINICS N. AM., 567, 588 (I993))). 
81 See Godfrey D. Pearlson et al., A Chart Review Study of Late-Onset and Early-Onset 
Schizophrenia, 146 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1568, 1568-74 (1989). 
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disorders less common than schizophrenia, reliable data regarding the effectiveness 
of psychotropic medications are more difficult to obtain.82 In most cases, then, 
unless a defendant has taken psychotropic medications in the past, a court will be 
unable to do more than offer a best guess as to which - if any - medications will 
render a defendant competent to stand trial. 83 
Statistical data can also indicate the general likelihood that antipsychotic 
medications will produce various side effects, but again, absent a defendant's 
previous experience with a particular medication, no method exists for making an 
individualized prediction about the side effects that the defendant will experience. 
For example, approximately twenty percent of people who take one of the newer, 
atypical antipsychotic drugs will experience acute extrapyramidal side effects84 such 
as akathesia, "a syndrome of the subjective feeling of anxiety, accompanied by 
restlessness, pacing, constant rocking back and forth, and other repetitive, pur-
poseless actions,"85 or dystonia, "characterized by involuntary muscle spasms and 
sustained abnormal, bizarre postures of the limbs, trunk, face and tongue. "86 In most 
cases, though, a court will have no way to determine whether a defendant will be 
part of the twenty percent of individuals who experience such effects or part of the 
eighty percent who do not. 
The impossibility of predicting how a particular defendant will respond to 
antipsychotic medications has prompted several courts to adopt a "medicate now, 
evaluate later" approach.87 The alternative, as the D.C. District Court recognized in 
82 See APA Brief, supra note 61, at 19-20 ("[T]he evidence respecting treatment of 
delusional disorder is less definitive than for schizophrenia and other more common 
psychotic illnesses (which also are less resistant to collecting systematic data)."). 
83 See United States v. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d 115, 136 (D.D.C.) ("[T]he reaction to 
medication is unique to each patient."), affd, 255 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir.), cen. denied, 534 
u.s. 1067 (2001). 
84 See Robert R. Conley & Raney Mahmoud, A Randomized Double-Blind Study of 
Risperidone and Olanzapine in the Treatment of Schizophrenia or Schizoaffective Disorder, 
158 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 765 (2001) ("Similar proportions of the risperidone and olanzapine 
groups reported extrapyramidal symptoms (24% and 20%, respectively)."). 
85 JULIEN, supra note 14, at 504. 
86 !d. at 505. 
87 See United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560, 572 (8th Cir. 2002) ("[W]e believe that the 
effects of the medication on Sell's competency and demeanor may properly be considered 
once the medication is administered."); United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 883 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001) ("We agree with the district court that '[t]here is no reason to conclude, at this 
time, that involuntary medication would preclude Weston from receiving a fair trial."' 
(quoting Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 137)) (alteration in original). 
The problem with this wait-and-see approach is the difficulty a court would face in 
determining whether the medication's side effects would cause a trial to be unfair, even when 
the court has the benefit of observing the defendant and assessing the actual side effects. 
How will a court determine whether the defendant's experience of moderate or even slight 
akathesia, for example, will violate the right to a fair trial? How distracted must the defendant 
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United States v. Weston, is never to allow involuntary medications for the purpose 
of rendering a defendant competent to stand trial: 
There are many uncertainties regarding the effects that 
medication will have on [the defendant's] demeanor and thought 
processes because the reaction to medication is unique to each 
patient. However, the Court rejects [the defendant's) attorneys' 
contention that this uncertainty precludes the use of medication 
in this context at this time. To interpret "clear and convincing" 
evidence as the defense suggests would effectively preclude 
involuntary medication in every case, since the government 
could never establish that a given individual would respond in 
a predictable manner, no matter how high the statistical 
probabilities. 88 
Because of both the probability that antipsychotic medications will alleviate at 
least some symptoms of a defendant's psychotic disorder, and the impossibility of 
predicting either the type or the severity of the side effects the defendant will 
experience, trial courts are likely to conclude that administering involuntary 
medications is substantially likely to further the government's interest in bringing 
a defendant to trial without causing side effects that will undermine the trial's 
fairness. 
A trial court must also decide whether involuntary medications are "necessary" 
for achieving the government's interests. 89 In discussing this requirement, the Court 
be before a court determines that the defendant cannot communicate with counsel or confront 
witnesses or testify in his own words? How can a court determine that even a minor motor 
tremor will not have a determinative effect on the jury's assessment of the defendant's 
character or credibility, and ultimately of his guilt or innocence? Of course, courts confront 
somewhat similar questions in determining competence to stand trial. See supra note 7 
(discussing the test for competence). But determining whether a defendant understands the 
nature of the charges against him or is capable of assisting his attorney is very different from 
predicting how a defendant's mental functioning ·and physical appearance will impact a 
jury's verdict. Additionally, an assessment of the defendant's competence to stand trial does 
not require a court to approve any government action, whereas the question raised by 
involuntary medications is how much government-induced prejudice a court should allow. 
Cf United States v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9, 21-22 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Tatel, J., concurring) 
("Here the question is whether due process permits the government through involuntary 
administration of psychotropic drugs to alter the defendant so that it becomes impossible for 
him to appear before the jury as he was when he committed the crime."). 
88 Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 136. 
89 Somewhat perplexing is the Sell Court's instruction to trial courts to consider not only 
the intrusiveness of medications as compared to other kinds of treatments, but also the 
intrusiveness of different methods of administering medications. Sell v. United States, 539 
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in Sell considered the suggestion of the American Psychological Association that 
some nondrug treatments might render a psychotic defendant competent to stand 
trial.90 Even the American Psychological Association acknowledged, however, that 
"such [alternative behavioral and psychosocial] therapies are often not adequate by 
themselves to treat acute psychotic disorders.'m Sell's own attorney conceded that 
U.S. 166, 181 (2003 ). In formulating this least intrusive route of administration requirement, 
the Court seems to have in mind that some ways of forcing a defendant to take involuntary 
medications, such as issuing a court order (the preferred way of the Court in Sell), are less 
unpleasant than some other ways, such as injecting the medications or administering them 
through a nasal tube. See id. What the Court does not discuss, however, is why medication 
that a defendant cooperatively takes, but only because of a court order, is constitutionally 
preferable to the same medication that is injected or administered through a nasal tube. The 
defendant's liberty interest in refusing medical treatment is equally compromised, regardless 
of how involuntary medications are administered. And involuntary medications that a 
defendant takes cooperatively are not any less likely to compromise the fairness of the 
defendant's trial. Thus, whether a defendant cooperates in response to a court order does not 
seem to change the constitutional equation: 
[A]n improper court order with which the defendant complies is no less 
an invasion of his rights than physically forcing compliance with such 
an improper order .... [W]e see no basis, therefore, for distinguishing 
between forced medication, whereby the defendant is restrained and 
injected, and medication pursuant to a court order with which the 
defendant complies. 
State v. Garcia, 658 A.2d 947,952 n.8 (Conn. 1995). 
Additionally, the Court in Sell does not indicate how a trial court should balance 
administering involuntary medications in the least intrusive way possible with other 
concerns, such as effectiveness in alleviating psychotic symptoms or severity of side effects. 
What if, as happens to be true, medications that can be injected are likely to cause more 
serious side effects than medications that can be administered to an uncooperative defendant 
only through a nasal tube? For example, several older, traditional antipsychotic medications, 
which are most likely to cause the most severe extrapyramidal side effects, are available in 
injectible forms, while almost all of the newer, atypical antipsychotics, which are less likely 
to cause such side effects, are available only in forms that must be ingested. Given that the 
Court in Sell does not address these details, it is unlikely that trial courts, in deciding that no 
means less intrusive than antipsychotic medications exist for rendering an incompetent, 
psychotic defendant competent to stand trial, will look further than the American 
Psychological Association's statement that nondrug "therapies are often not adequate by 
themselves to treat acute psychotic disorders," Brief of American Psychological Association 
at 12, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (No. 02-5664), or the American Psychiatric 
Association's statement that "[g]iven the dearth of comparably effective alternatives to 
antipsychotic medication, a defendant may remain incompetent to stand trial indefinitely," 
APA Brief, supra note 61, at 25. 
90 Sell, 539 U.S. at 181. 
91 Brief of Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association at 12, Sell v. United 
States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (No. 02-5664). 
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without the ability to administer psychotropic medications, the government's only 
choices would be to hold Sell under a civil commitment statute or to release him.92 
Given that antipsychotic medications are the standard treatment for psychotic 
disorders, and that a defendant who does not receive antipsychotic medications 
might well remain psychotic indefinitely, trial courts are unlikely to pause for very 
long over the requirement that the medications must be "necessary" for achieving 
the government's interest in bringing a defendant to trial.93 Similarly, courts are apt 
to have little trouble with the related requirement that they consider less intrusive 
alternatives,94 given that no alternatives - less intrusive or otherwise - are as 
likely as antipsychotic medications to reduce psychotic symptoms and render a 
defendant competent to stand trial. 
In sum, the test outlined in Sell is unlikely to result in the administration of 
involuntary medications to incompetent defendants in only rare instances. More 
likely, it will continue to be rare that a trial court determines that administering 
involuntary medications is not "medically appropriate, ... substantially unlikely to 
have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial, and, taking account of 
less intrusive alternatives, ... necessary significantly to further important govern-
mental trial-related interests."95 
C. An Equal Protection Challenge Waiting to Happen 
In addition to setting out the test that courts must apply before allowing the 
government to administer involuntary medications for the purpose of rendering a 
defendant competent to stand trial, the Sell decision instructs trial courts to first 
consider whether involuntary medications may be justified on the basis of an 
incompetent defendant's dangerousness to self or others. 96 Only if involuntary 
medications cannot be justified on the basis of a defendant's dangerousness should 
a court consider whether involuntary medications are justified on the basis of the 
defendant's incompetence to stand trial.97 
92 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 23-25, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) 
(No. 02-5664); see also Sell, 282 F.3d at 568 (noting that Sell's expert "did not suggest any 
alternative means [to antipsychotic medications] of restoring competency"). 
93 Sell, 539 U.S. at 181. 
94 !d. (indicating courts must consider less intrusive alternatives). · 
95 Id. at 179. 
96 /d. at 183 ("[A] court, asked to approve forced administration of drugs for purposes of 
rendering a defendant competent to stand trial, should ordinarily determine whether the 
government seeks, or has first sought, permission for forced administration of drugs on these 
other Harper-type [dangerousness] grounds."). 
97 /d. ("If a court authorizes medication on those alternative [dangerousness] grounds, the 
need to consider authorization on trial competence grounds will likely disappear."). 
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The Supreme Court explained that trial courts should first determine whemer 
involuntary medications may be justified on the basis of dangerousness because "the 
inquiry into whether medication is permissible, say, to render an individual 
nondangerous is usually more 'objective and manageable' than the inquiry into 
whether medication is permissible to render a defendant competent."98 It is hard to 
imagine, however, a more forthright invitation to violations of the constitutional 
guarantee of "equal protection of the laws."99 Under this provision of Sell, the 
criteria that courts must use to determine whether the government can administer 
involuntary medications -with the accompanying possibility of compromised trial 
rights - will vary depending upon whether an incompetent defendant is also a 
danger to himself or others. But both an incompetent defendant who is dangerous 
and an incompetent defendant who is not dangerous have exactly the same interest 
in receiving a fair trial- or in the language of equal protection jurisprudence, they 
are similarly situated with regard to the right to a fair trial. 100 Further, no sufficiently 
important government interest justifies treating incompetent defendants unequally 
with respect to trial rights on the basis of dangerousness to self or others. 
98 !d. at 182 (quoting Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 140 (1992) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)). As Justice Kennedy explained, though, immediately following the sentence in 
his concurrence observing that determining whether to allow involuntary medications for the 
purpose of diminishing dangerousness is "objective and manageable," the question for the 
Court is more difficult when the government seeks to administer involuntary medications for 
the purpose of rendering a defendant competent to stand trial because the potential 
consequences for the defendant are more serious: "It is ... medicating the person for the 
purpose of bringing him to trial, that causes most serious concern." Riggins, 504 U.S. at 
140-41 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy could not have meant that a court can 
sidestep an issue merely because it is difficult, if the result will be the unequal protection of 
defendants' right to a fair trial. Other courts have recognized that in deciding whether to 
allow the government to administer involuntary medications to an incompetent defendant, 
regardless of the purpose for administering the medications, a court must take into account 
the pretrial status of the defendant: 
To the extent that Weston is in custody by reason of his incompetency 
to stand trial, the relevant issues are at least his dangerousness to 
himself and others, and the government's ability to bring him to trial. 
But until he is convicted, Weston's rights and the relevant issues must 
be viewed through a somewhat different prism than those for a 
convicted prisoner. Weston's custodial status does not entail the 
relinquishment of all rights that a person facing trial possesses, and 
Riggins' departure from Harper signals as much. In other words, the 
issue raised by Weston was not settled in Harper. 
United States v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Rogers, J., concurring). 
99 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
100 See, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citing 
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)) (indicating that the Equal Protection Clause "is 
essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike"). 
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1. Unequal Protection of Trial Rights 
As the Court in Sell recognized, tests for determining whether to allow 
involuntary medications for the purpose of diminishing a defendant's dangerousness 
are substantially different from the test for determining whether to allow involuntary 
medications for the purpose of rendering a defendant competent to stand trial. 101 
And while the criteria for allowing involuntary medications on the basis of incom-
petence to stand trial might provide inadequate protection of an incompetent 
defendant's trial rights, 102 the criteria for allowing involuntary medications on the 
basis of dangerousness afford these rights no protection at all. 
The specific statutory provisions governing the administration of involuntary 
medications for the purpose of diminishing dangerousness vary from state to state, 
although all states allow involuntary treatment when a person is, because of a mental 
illness, an imminent threat to the physical safety of himself or someone else. 103 
Some states also allow involuntary treatment when a mentally ill person is "gravely 
disabled," meaning that he is unable to meet his basic needs such as the need for 
food or shelter, or has a long history of deteriorating when not taking medications. 104 
But legislatures have developed these criteria with the goal of furthering the 
government's interest in ensuring citizens' safety while also protecting the liberty 
interest in refusing medical treatment of those who are potentially subject to civil 
commitment- not while also protecting the trial rights of those who are potentially 
subject to criminal prosecution. 105 The Court in Sell acknowledges as much in 
explaining that the lower courts failed to consider adequately the potential of 
involuntary medications to infringe Sell's right to a fair trial: 
The failure to focus upon trial competence could well have 
mattered. Whether a particular drug will tend to sedate a 
101 See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
102 See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text. 
103 The Supreme Court stated in Addington v. Texas that "the initial inquiry in a civil 
commitment proceeding" is "[ w ]hether the individual is mentally ill and dangerous to either 
himself or others and is in need of confined therapy." 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979). 
104 See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 215 n.3 (1990). 
Under Washington law, a person is "gravely disabled," and may 
therefore be administered involuntary treatment, if: as a result of a 
mental disorder [the individual]: (a) [i]s in danger of serious physical 
harm resulting from a failure to provide for his essential human needs 
of health or safety, or (b) manifests severe deterioration in routine func-
tioning evidenced by repeated and escalating loss of cognitive or 
volitional control over his or her actions and is not receiving such care 
as is essential for his or her health or safety. 
ld. (second alteration in original). 
105 ld. 
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defendant, interfere with communication with counsel, prevent 
rapid reaction to trial developments, or diminish the ability to 
express emotions are matters important in determining the 
permissibility of medication to restore competence, but not 
necessarily relevant when dangerousness is primarily at issue. 
We cannot tell whether the side effects of antipsychotic 
medication were likely to undermine the fairness of a trial in 
Sell's case. 106 
Does the Court mean that these trial rights would have been less important to 
Sell if the government could have administered involuntary medications to him 
because he was dangerous? This clearly cannot be the case: a defendant who is a 
danger to himself or others is no less in need of a fair trial than is a defendant who 
is not a danger to himself or others. Yet the exact same concerns about the right to 
a fair trial are raised when medications are administered to a dangerous defendant 
as when administered to a nondangerous defendant. If, for example, involuntary 
medications cause a defendant to be unable to pay attention to what prosecution 
witnesses are saying, the resulting infringement of the right of confrontation would 
be no less of a Sixth Amendment violation simply because the medications were 
administered for the purpose of diminishing the defendant's dangerousness rather 
than for the purpose of rendering the defendant competent to stand trial. 107 
2. Inadequate Justification 
The Equal Protection Clause allows the government to treat similarly situated 
people differently if such treatment is justified by an adequate governmental 
interest. 108 Whether a governmental interest is adequate depends upon the nature of 
the individual interest involved. 109 Unequal treatment involving a non-fundamental 
interest requires only "that the classification at issue bears some fair relationship to 
a legitimate public purpose."110 Unequal treatment involving a fundamental interest, 
however, requires a "classification [that] has been precisely tailored to serve a 
compelling governmental interest."111 The right to a fair trial is among the most 
fundamental of individual interests. 112 Yet the only governmental interest the Court 
106 Sell, 539 U.S. at 185-86 (citation omitted) (finding the lower court failed to consider 
adequately the potential infringement of Sell's fair trial rights). 
107 The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of a defendant "to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
108 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982). 
109 ld. 
110 /d. 
111 ld. at 217. 
112 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) ("From the very beginning, our 
state and national constitution and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and 
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in Sell identifies as possibly justifying the unequal protection of incompetent 
defendants' trial rights is that the criteria for deciding whether to allow involuntary 
medications for the purpose of diminishing a defendant's dangerousness are more 
"objective and manageable" than the criteria for deciding whether to allow 
involuntary medications for the purpose of rendering a defendant competent to stand 
trial. 113 The interest in applying a less cumbersome standard can hardly be consid-
ered compelling, however, in light of how rarely the Court finds a government 
interest to be compelling114 and in comparison with the particular interests that the 
Court has found to be compelling. 115 
Courts may indeed find it easier to decide whether to allow the government to 
administer involuntary medications for the purpose of diminishing a defendant's 
dangerousness than to decide whether to allow the government to administer 
involuntary medications for the purpose of rendering a defendant competent to stand 
trial. 116 But allowing courts to avoid, on the basis of a defendant's dangerousness, 
the more difficult questions is contrary to the mandates of equal protection, given 
that (1) any medications a court decides to allow will pose exactly the same threat 
to the defendant's trial rights, regardless of why they are administered, and (2) the 
government lacks any interest sufficiently important to justify the disparate 
protection of trial rights on the basis of whether an incompetent defendant is a 
danger to himself or others. Thus, the Court's directive that a trial court ought first 
to determine whether a defendant may be administered involuntary medications on 
diminishing dangerousness grounds before (and perhaps instead of) considering 
whether he may be administered involuntary medications on rendering competent 
to stand trial grounds creates a curious hole in the protection afforded the trial rights 
substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every 
defendant stands equal before the law."); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,462 (1938) ("The 
Sixth Amendment stands as a constant admonition that if the constitutional safeguards it 
provides be lost, justice will not 'still be done."'). 
113 See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
114 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Foreword: The Vanishing 
Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REv. 43, 73 ( 1989) ("If a fundamental right or a suspect class is 
involved, the Court will exercise strict scrutiny, and the government rarely succeeds."). 
115 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (finding racial diversity to be a 
compelling interest); Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 ( 1989) (finding 
"a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors"); 
Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358 (W.D. Ky. 2000) (finding 
that a school district's voluntary maintenance of a desegregated school system was a 
compelling state interest). 
116 See supra note 98 and accompanying text (indicating that the question whether to allow 
the government to administer involuntary medications for the purpose of diminishing 
dangerousness is more "objective and manageable" than the question whether to allow the 
government to administer involuntary medications for the purpose of rendering a defendant 
competent to stand trial). 
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of mentally ill defendants who are both dangerous and incompetent to stand tna1, 
as compared to those who are incompetent to stand trial but not dangerous. 
II. AND CURIO USER: WHAT THE COURT DOES NOT SAY IN SELL 
Along with the several curious things the Court does say in its Sell decision are 
several curiosities by omission. The first is that the Court did not consider - or at 
least offers no evidence that it did consider - the recent experiences of the federal 
courts in the District of Columbia as they decided whether to allow the government 
to administer involuntary medications to Russell Weston, who like Sell, was found 
incompetent to stand trial and has refused to take voluntarily the medications that 
might render him competent. 117 
In 1998, Weston entered the U.S. Capitol building and shot three police officers, 
killing two of them.118 Three years later, the second appellate panel to review the 
case affirmed the district court's second decision allowing the government to 
compel Weston to take psychotropic medications for the purpose of rendering him 
competent to stand trial. 119 Before deciding to deciding to allow the government to 
administer involuntary medications, the Weston district court considered (and 
reconsidered) every question that the Court has now stated in Sell should be 
considered. For example, the Supreme Court in Sell found that the lower courts had 
failed to consider sufficiently the "trial-related side effects and risks" posed by 
involuntary medications. 120 The final district court opinion in Weston, though, 
contains page after page on the issue of side effects and risks relating to trials, 121 yet 
still comes to the same conclusion as the lower courts in Sell: that the court could 
not predict whether antipsychotic medications would cause side effects that would 
compromise the right to a fair trial. 122 Instead, the district court decided that it 
would allow the government to administer involuntary medications to Weston and 
117 Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d 115 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 255 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir.), cen. denied, 
534 U.S. 1067 (2001). Although the Supreme Court can only decide the particular case or 
controversy before it, the Court is nonetheless free to comment on decisions of lower courts 
in other cases, and often does so, especially when - as here -disagreement exists among 
the lower courts. For example, in another of the 2003 Term's attention-attracting cases, 
Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court referred, in discussing the Court's Bakke opinion, to 
"divergent opinions of the lower courts," and then cited several. 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003). 
118 Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 117. 
119 United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d873 (D.C. Cir.), cen. denied, 534 U.S. 1067 (2001). 
120 Sell, 539 U.S. at 185. 
121 See Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 132-38. 
122 /d. at 136-37 ("It is difficult for the Court to determine at this point whether unaccept-
able trial prejudice would result from the medication."); Sell, 282 F.3d at 572 ("[W]e believe 
that the effects of the medication on Sell's competency and demeanor may properly be 
considered once the medication is administered. The district court noted its willingness to 
re-examine Sell's Sixth Amendment claim after the medication regimen has begun."). 
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would revisit the issue of trial rights once his response to the medications could be 
observed. 123 
The Supreme Court declined to review Weston, 124 which evidences only that 
fewer than four Justices voted to grant certiorari. 125 But given that the Sell Court 
must have been aware of the extensive record in Weston, 126 and perhaps also the 
extent to which other lower courts, 127 including those in Sell, 128 have relied on the 
Weston cases, the absence of a single citation to Weston is curious, like the 
proverbial elephant in the room that everyone sees but no one mentions. 129 
A final curiosity is the absence of an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy. 
Perhaps all the citations to his concurring opinion in Riggins130 were sufficient to 
persuade him to sign on to the majority's opinion. In previous involuntary medi-
cation cases, though, Justice Kennedy has been the voice of insight and reason, 
authoring the Court's opinion in Harper, 131 and then recognizing- in a concurring 
opinion not joined at the time by any other member of the Court132 -that Riggins 
was "not a case like Washington v. Harper." 133 During oral argument in Sell, Justice 
Kennedy alone pressed the basic question of why the government thought it was 
123 Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 137 ("The Court will reassess, upon request, its 
determination regarding the prejudice to Weston's fair trial rights resulting from medication 
when testimony about the actual, not hypothetical, impact of the medication is available."). 
For a discussion of some of the problems with this approach, see supra note 87. 
124 United States v. Weston, 534 U.S. 1067 (2001) (denying certiorari). 
125 See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 492 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice 
Frankfurter wrote: 
I d. 
We have repeatedly indicated that a denial of certiorari means only 
that, for one reason or another which is seldom disclosed, and not 
infrequently for conflicting reasons which may have nothing to do with 
the merits and certainly may have nothing to do with any view of the 
merits taken by a majority of the Court, there were not four members 
of the Court who thought the case should be heard. 
126 For example, the amicus brief submitted by the American Psychiatric Association, and 
cited by the Court in its opinion, cited "passim" United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001). APA Brief, supra note 61, at ii. 
127 See, e.g., United States v. Gomes, 289 F.3d 71, 79-82, 85-88 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing 
Weston cases). 
128 Sell, 282 F.3d at 565, 567 n.7 (citing Weston cases). 
129 If the Court in Sell had stated that the government could not administer involuntary 
medications to Sell because he was charged with nonviolent offenses, then Sell and Weston 
could be distinguished. But the Court instead stated that crimes against property, like those 
against people, can be serious. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
130 Sell, 539 U.S. at 179, 181, 185 (citing Justice Kennedy's Riggins concurrence). 
131 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 213 (1990). 
132 The majority in Sell now seems to be in full accord with Justice Kennedy's 
concurrence. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
133 Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 140 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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entitled "at all" to simultaneously prosecute a defendant and compel him to taKe 
psychotropic medications. 134 
CONCLUSION 
It is doubtful that Sell will be the Court's last word on involuntary medications 
and incompetent criminal defendants. Eventually, involuntary medications will 
render a defendant competent to stand trial, 135 in a case in which the defendant 
chooses to go to trial rather than to accept a plea bargain. Thus eventually, the 
question before the Court will be whether the government really can, without 
violating a whole host of constitutionally protected trial rights, 136 place in front of 
a jury a defendant to whom it is administering involuntary medications. Perhaps 
then Justice Kennedy will write an opinion that cures all of Sell's other curiosities. 
134 
"I do not understand your basic authority to do this at all." PBS NewsHour, Update, 
supra note 61 (quoting Justice Kennedy's question to a government lawyer). 
135 The government has, for example, administered involuntary medications to Weston 
from early 2002 until at least November 19, 2003. Weston, 260 F. Supp. 2d at 148-49 
(authorizing the government to continue administering involuntary medications until 
November 19, 2003). 
136 See supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text. 
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